MITI and the Japanese miracle

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development, such as the imperialism of the Pacific War, were disastrous, but that does not alter the fact that its priorities have been consistent. A state attempting to match the economic achievements of Japan must adopt the same priorities as Japan. It must first of all be a developmental stateand only then a regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt. This commitment to development does not, of course, guarantee any particular degree of success; it is merely prerequisite.

Given that Japan's state priorities have been remarkably consistent during the middle of the twentieth century, one must quickly add that Japan's record in achieving its priorities has been mixed. This is not to question the great and lasting achievements of the Japanese economy after 1955. The nation's economic strength at the end of the 1970's and its collective wisdom concerning what is necessary to support 115 million people with few natural resources at a per capita GNP of around $9,000 to $10,000 1978 dollars suggest that Japan should be able to maintain its own population in the manner it has come to expect, and also to contribute to the welfare of others, for many decades to come. It is rather to stress that the high-growth system cannot be reduced to any particular device or institution, to the rate of saving, or the employment system, or the banking system; and that the high-growth system certainly was not the invention of any single person or party at a particular time. Japan's achievements were the result of a tortuous learning and adaptation process that in the present context began with the financial panic of 1927 and ended with the adjustments in the wake of the oil shock of 1973.

The high-growth system, like the basic priorities of the state, was not so much a matter of choice for Japan as of necessity; it grew out of a series of economic crises that assailed the nation throughout the Showa * era. The most obvious of these, in addition to the financial panic of 1927 and the oil shock, include the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the fascist attacks on capitalism during the 1930's, the war with China from 1937 to 1941, the Pacific War, the collapse of the economy in 1946, the Dodge Line of 1949, the postKorean War recession of 1954, the trade liberalization of the early 1960's, the recession of 1965, the capital liberalization of 196776, and the health and safety crises of the early 1970's. It is of course gratifying that Japan ultimately gained a powerful conception of how to achieve its priorities and then applied this conception with rigor and thoroughness. But it would be to reason in an ahistorical and ill-informed manner to fail to note that