MITI and the Japanese miracle

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venerable head of Keidanren, let it be known that he favored self-imposed control. He went on to say that "all the government has to do is watch for fires and thieves. It can leave the rest of work up to civilians"; but he also believed that "opponents of foreign investment are like grown men wearing diapers, refusing to leave their mothers' breasts."

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Although Keidanren refused to support the bill, Sahashi did gain the support of its rival organization, the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai*).

The second controversy concerned the law's stipulation that banks and bankers be included in the various "discussion groups." Leaders of the banking community concluded, accurately, that this was a direct attack on their keiretsu; and the Ministry of Finance responded with indignation to this intrusion into its territory by MITI. Usami Makoto, president of the Mitsubishi Bank and then chairman of the National Banking Association (Zenkoku Ginko* Kyokai*), refused to have anything to do with the Special Measures Law.

The third controversy was generated by the Fair Trade Commission and its belief that Sahashi was trying to get rid of the Antimonopoly Law once and for all. On December 5, 1962, Sahashi opened negotiations with the FTC concerning the purposes of the law, the threat posed by liberalization to Japan's economy, and the need for cartels. After some six meetings Sahashi seemed to have made some headway with the commission, and on February 1, 1963, the ministry published the law. Nevertheless, after the matter went to the cabinet, Ikeda still had to order the FTC to cooperate.

Sahashi's main backing in these disputes came from the Industrial Structure Investigation Council. The Industrial Order Committee (headed by Professor Arisawa), which Sahashi had consulted on every step he took, was his main bastion of strength, but during October 1962 the Industrial Finance Committee (Sangyo* Kin'yu* Bukai) also contributed its support. Headed by Nakayama Sohei of the Industrial Bank, and with only four other members (former MITI Vice-Minister Ueno, the president of a paper company, a newspaper executive, and the president of the Export-Import Bank), the committee concluded that adding banks to the discussion groups was an excellent idea and long overdue.

Given the general furor, the politicians had no choice but to step in and try to resolve these numerous issues. On February 14, 1963, Prime Minister Ikeda ordered all the economic ministers in the cabinet to meet with him on a regular basis until the law's future was decided. Hardly a week after this group went to work, the Kansai Branch of Keidanren expressed its formal opposition to MITI's pro-