Dragon Fire

RAF Upper Heyford, Gloucestershire, UK

The suggestion of using the F-16 multi-role combat aircraft either from Incirlick in Turkey or one of the bases in the Gulf was dismissed in less than fifteen minutes. The host governments all had significant Islamic opinion to take into account. This strike was not worth upsetting it.

The second option, of using F-18 Hornets on board the 102,000 tonne USS John C. Stennis in the Gulf of Oman, was thrown out equally quickly. The aircraft’s range was 1,600 kilometres and they could have completed their mission by refuelling 500 kilometres from the carrier and again on the way back, using tankers from Kuwait and Turkey. But with both options, American pilots’ lives would be put at unnecessary risk. The aircraft would be over hostile territory, and liaising with Indian pilots who might have to provide cover would be impossible.

The aircraft chosen for the mission was a single American B-52 bomber flying out of RAF Upper Heyford in England. It carried twenty BGM-109 Conventional Airborne Cruise Missiles (CACMs) with special warheads. For four decades, the B-52 had been the mainstay of the American bomber force and when it was due to be finally scrapped in 2038 it would have been in service for eighty-two years. Technology had advanced tenfold since it flew its first mission. The B-52 was adapted accordingly and it remained the most versatile bomber in the American order of battle.

Shortly before it took off from the base in Gloucestershire, the crew saw the latest 116 Keyhole spy satellite photographs of the Rawalpindi cantonment area, under which Hamid Khan operated from the Pakistani war room. Throughout the night, other equally sensitive satellites had passed over the area, with optical equipment which cut through the darkness.

They also had access to special Doppler radar imagery gathered by a stealth AWACs aircraft flying high above Rawalpindi. It was the first time the United States had used the facility in a real conflict situation. Known as Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) it could produce three-dimensional images of objects as far as 45 metres below ground or sea. Trials were as yet incomplete, but the implications were already enormous. Not only would it allow surveillance inside enemy bunkers, such as suspected nuclear facilities in North Korea or biological weapons bunkers in Iraq, it might also make the submarine, particularly those carrying nuclear missiles, a far more vulnerable weapon of war.

Ideally, the GPR is used on board a helicopter. The stiller it is the clearer the picture. But over enemy territory this is too risky. So the images fed back to Washington of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi were not as clear as they could be, but the information was enough to characterize the target and therefore determine whether the special warheads to be used would be able to take it out of action. The underground tunnels linking the various Pakistani bunkers showed up clearly and confirmed for the first time the actual command and control centre being used by Hamid Khan.

The Americans’ main concern was that Khan had taken to a mobile strategic communications system, of which the Pakistani DEFCOM was the most sophisticated, embracing both satellite and microwave links. It remained in the field and, as yet, undetected. Given that Khan was also head of government, he might have opted to use the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the centre for the Joint Services, which was better placed for direct liaison with the civilian government. But it was equally possible that Khan would feel more at home and physically secure on his own turf, which would be the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi — and this was confirmed by the GPR.

Analysts had picked out images of movement within that bunker and other specific targets believed to be the entrances, the control tower at the airfield, the officers’ mess, the clinic and others. In one picture, three men were photographed going into the clinic, carrying boxes of supplies.

Indian Mirage-2000Hs, MiG-27MLs and SU30s continued to pound Pakistan air defences, and shortly before the B-52 was ready to launch aircraft descended to destroy key buildings in the complex, using fire and deep-penetration bombs.

The B-52 flying outside of Pakistan airspace over international waters south of Karachi carried twelve missiles externally and they launched those first. They were followed by four more from the bomb bay and four were held back in reserve. The type of warhead had never been used in modern conflict. John Hastings had told Dixit that the United States would not be involved in any offensive lethal action against Pakistan. But on advice from Alvin Jebb, the American Defence Secretary, he had agreed to use non-lethal weapons to neutralize Hamid Khan’s command and control of nuclear weapons. Jebb was keen to test the weapons in a combat situation which he saw as a perfect, high-profile use of non-lethal weapons.

As the Tomahawks exactly hit their target, there was no fireball or wrenching explosion. That had been carried out by the Indians. Instead, almost farcically, a thin, fog-like foam was dispersed over specific areas. Immediately, it began hardening and within minutes had become as immovable as concrete, sealing the exits to the bunker like a glue. The Indian bombs had left hundreds of anti-personnel mines on the ground, demanding an exhaustive process before Hamid Khan and his staff could be got out.

It was impossible to know what contingency plans — if any — Khan had drawn up for this type of attack. But American SIGINT operators confirmed that Pakistan’s command and control structure had gone dead, leaving individual commanders to fend for themselves. There was no communication from Hamid Khan’s bunker, and, only when the conflict had ended did it become clear what had happened to him.