Dragon Fire

Prime Minister’s Office, South Block, New Delhi, India

‘Let me get this clear, Prime Minister,’ said Unni Khrishnan, the Chief of Army Staff. ‘You believe that China and Pakistan have an agreement to sever the north-east militarily, and at the same time move in on Kashmir. But I am convinced China does not want war.’

‘No, perhaps it doesn’t. But it will go as far as it can by pushing it to the edge.’ Dixit put on his spectacles and looked down. ‘I think the answer might lie in this memo I have in front of me. It was written to Pakistani Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1966 by Zulfi Bhutto, who was then Foreign Minister. We should note the circumstances. Pakistan had just been defeated by us in the 1965 war. Bhutto considered the terms of the truce unacceptable and was quoted as saying that Pakistan needed complete victory over India. The only alternative would be Pakistan’s destruction as a self-respecting nation. He described the Tashkent Agreement which ended the hostilities as a national humiliation and diplomatic betrayal. Then he outlined his plan, and I am convinced that Hamid Khan has borrowed Bhutto’s strategy to use for his own foreign policy. Remember, of course, that Bangladesh was still East Pakistan.

‘“The defence of East Pakistan would need to be closely coordinated with Chinese actions both in the north-east of India and also possibly in the regions of Sikkim and Nepal. It would be necessary to provide the Chinese with a link-up with our forces in that sector. I envisage a lightning thrust across the narrow Indian territory that separates Pakistan” — or Bangladesh as it is now — “from Nepal.”’

Dixit looked up. ‘Bhutto was referring to the Chicken’s Neck, exactly the same area which the terrorists held this morning. “From our point of view, this would be highly desirable,” he wrote. “It would be to the advantage of Nepal to secure its freedom from isolation by India. It would solve the problem of Sikkim and Tibet.” ’

‘It would also deal with China’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh,’ said Prabhu Purie, ‘and bring Bhutan and Nepal into the Chinese sphere of influence.’

‘In short, gentlemen,’ Dixit went on, ‘that is the price the Chinese dictatorship is asking us to pay for peace. We give Kashmir to Pakistan. Expel the Dalai Lama and much of the Tibetan community from India. Abandon our security obligations to Bhutan and Nepal and renegotiate our borders with a view to handing over Arunachal Pradesh and giving independence back to Sikkim. And it will go like that, chiselling away at us to make us the weaker power in Asia.’ He paused, lost in his own thoughts for a moment, then summed up: ‘It is not the road democratic India would seek to go down.’