Dragon Fire

Prime Minister’s Residence, Tokyo, Japan

Prime Minister Shigeto Wada put the telephone down from a conversation with John Hastings and thought hard, not about what the American President had said, but how he had said it. Wada’s grandfather had been an administrative official in Taiwan and Wada himself had always looked on Taiwan’s development with pride as if some of its success at least was down to the infrastructure and manner in which Japan had ruled the islands. Chinese military action against Taiwan now would not directly affect the treaty obligations the United States had with Japan. But given China’s Dragon Strike campaign of a few years back and its expansion into the Indian Ocean, it was only inevitable that the two East Asian powers would come into conflict again, possibly sooner rather than later.

His intelligence chief General Shigehiko Ogawa had already predicted a horrific Chinese onslaught on Taiwan within a few hours, certainly before the celebrations were due to start at noon. John Hastings had spoken like a man who wished the problem would go away.

‘We are talking to the Chinese and the Taiwanese about this,’ Hastings had said. ‘You can be assured we do everything to maintain peace in the Taiwan Straits.’

Wada was not convinced. He felt a tiredness in America, a sense that its days of fighting wars in Asia were over. It had given Japan and its neighbours a generous security umbrella for sixty years, and had allowed Japan two generations to grow out of the shame it felt after its defeat in the Second World War. But time had to move on. Wada also faced a more practical difficulty. As soon as China attacked, he expected the United States to use its base at Okinawa as a launching point for military action against the mainland. That would put Japanese sovereign territory under a direct threat of Chinese attack.

The debate about Japan’s defence role was not new, but Taiwan’s declaration of independence had focused his thoughts. In the past five years, Japan had brought in Boeing 767 mid-air refuelling tankers for its F-14 fighters and launched the Osumi carrier, which could be used with either helicopters or jump-jets. It had put up four spy satellites, which gave it the best imagery in the region, and had brought in long-range air transport planes to deliver troops or rescue Japanese citizens from anywhere in the world.

Wada glanced at his desk-top screen to see the first official Chinese reaction to the Taiwanese announcement. It had come out quickly, but the words were familiar, showing a lack of imagination within the Chinese leadership.

‘The Chinese government and people will not tolerate any action for Taiwan independence or any attempt to separate Taiwan from the motherland,’ said the Xinhua statement. ‘China’s territory and sovereignty are indivisible. The Taiwan question is purely an internal matter for China. If there occurs any action for Taiwanese independence or any attempt by foreign forces to separate Taiwan from the motherland, the Chinese government and people will not sit back and do nothing.’

The fact that China had chosen to release the statement now was an almost certain indication that it would take military action. To do anything less would be an unacceptable loss of face to President Tao and the military.

Under the constitution, the Japanese navy could patrol 2,400 kilometres out to sea. One of its tasks was to keep shipping lanes open with Japanese minesweepers. It was also allowed to give logistical and medical support to American forces in combat in the region. Japanese forces were, of course, allowed to defend themselves if they came under attack. None of this conflicted with the constitutional declaration that Japan would ‘for ever renounce war as a sovereign right’.

‘John Chiu, the Prime Minister of Singapore, is on the telephone,’ said Wada’s long-serving personal assistant, whose desk was in the far corner of his large office.

‘John, I can imagine the purpose of this call,’ said Wada in English.

‘Taiwan,’ said Chiu. ‘Our analysts believe China will attack within two hours.’

‘I have the same reading.’

‘I have just come out of an emergency Cabinet meeting and some members are listening in to this telephone call. Our conclusion was this. For many years our founding Prime Minister was of the view that Japan could never take the mantle of the main regional power in East Asia. However, China’s policies in the recent years have made us uneasy about this view. The events of the past few days have led us to conclude that Singapore would support a strategic pact between India and Japan in Asia. Also we would remain politically neutral should you decide to defend the stability of East Asia in whatever manner you thought right during this current Taiwan crisis. Some time within the next half-century, we will see the American security umbrella close. We believe that now is the time to establish an Asian security umbrella, and we want to see it done not with one power, China, but with two — Japan and India. As you know, Singapore is predominantly Chinese and there will be domestic difficulties with our new thinking. This is why we will be muted in our public support, until we can sustain it. I’m sure you understand.’

Minutes after Wada had finished his call from John Chiu, Hari Dixit was on the line from Delhi. ‘Prime Minister, this is a humbling call for me, but a frank one. It is also too late in the day, but in present circumstances that is beside the point. You have often approached us informally for closer ties and we have responded with insular arrogance. India has been an inward-looking nation, living on a false premise that it was a great country simply waiting for its time to come. We have had a jolt of reality in the past week and that is why I am calling you.’

‘A call from the Prime Minister of India is always welcome,’ said Wada.

‘I believe the international community would support an alliance between our two democracies. I believe that right now it would support action against China. We will hit them on our eastern flank and win back Burma for the free world. We will support vigorously any action you take to contain China in its efforts to keep Taiwan.’