Dragon Fire

USS Ronald Reagan, Bay of Bengal: 15° N, 85° E

President Tao’s command came through as a two-syllable message picked up by the National Security Agency listening station at Menwith Hill in northern England, sent through to the NSA at CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii and relayed immediately to the commander of the USS Ronald Reagan. It comprised yet another phrase, not encrypted, but compressed so that the transmission time was just a fraction of a second. Long Huo, it said, Dragon Fire, beamed down from the same orbiting Chinese satellite which had instructed the Kilo-class submarine to attack the Bombay. An encrypted and frequency-hopping signal almost certainly coming from the Xia-class nuclear armed submarine in the Bay of Bengal was sent back. The Xia could not pick up signals under water and must have been at least at periscope depth. It was daylight and unlucky that no ship was in the vicinity when the Xia came up. The NSA analysts put the vessel at about 150 kilometres south-west of the carrier group. A call was sent to all shipping, commercial and military, to look out for the submarine. Even then it was like finding a needle in a haystack.

The Indians were carrying out round-the-clock antisubmarine patrols in the area of probability where it was thought the Xia could be. The Americans were doing the same, and their experience and more sophisticated equipment, such as trailing kilometres of sonar buoys through the area of probability, meant that vast areas of sea were being eliminated. But none got a positive identification. The water was deep and the Xia had dived. If it was carrying the JL-2, it could be fired from anywhere inside the Bay of Bengal and hit a target in India.

The Xia was under orders to receive messages every twelve hours, and as the Indian missile attack was detected it was on schedule to come up. Had Tao hesitated with his decision, it would have been another half-day before he could have given the command.