Dragon Fire

India — Pakistan border, Rajasthan, India

First came the relentless explosions of the artillery barrage laid down from the batteries of guns behind him. He had asked for more of the 155mm Bofors FH-77B, which had a range of thirty-two kilometres and were capable of firing ten rounds a minute. But the bribery scandal which had erupted years earlier, when the guns were being purchased from Sweden, left the army with a shortage. Only 410 guns were delivered out of the initial order of 1,500. Of those 120 had to be cannibalized to keep the others operational. Most were deployed on the Kashmir front. General Gurjit Singh had argued for more, but was given only twenty guns for this battle.

The mainstay of the artillery barrage was carried out by the reliable 105mm Indian field guns, with sixty batteries of eight guns each. And the most devastating attacks for the Pakistanis came from the 300mm Smerch and the 212mm Pinaka multi-rocket launchers, mounted on specially tracked vehicles better suited to the desert conditions. These weapons, which went off like machine guns, sent a blistering cordon of anti-tank bomblets and anti-tank mines against the 10th and 14th Pakistani Armoured Brigades of XXXI Corps. They had come down towards the border from their headquarters at Bahawalpur 160 kilometres north-east of Rahimyar Khan and from the south from Sukkur. The Smerch was so powerful that a salvo of rockets could be fired in less than forty seconds with accuracy better than 25 per cent and an ability to cover an area of 672,000 square metres.

Singh received regular updates of the damage being inflicted, knowing that the Pakistanis had no such remote-sensing capabilities. They would probably be getting some intelligence from the Chinese. But, almost certainly, nothing would be forthcoming from the Americans. In the two areas where cloud cover had prevented defined images — around Madagargh and Sandh, about ten kilometres inside Pakistan — Singh had deployed lower-flying aerial drones.

When the artillery barrage lulled, he watched the first vapour trails of the deep-penetrating Jaguars and the agile MiG-27s heading in to bomb airfields, armour concentrations, depots, bridges, roads and enemy command headquarters. And that was when Pakistani F-16s scrambled from Sukkur, Bahawulpur, Multan and Sargodha.

Singh had deployed the SA-8b Ghecko single-stage solid-fuel short-range anti-aircraft defence system together with the Tunguska-M1 low-level integrated air-defence system with two twin-barrel 30mm anti-aircraft guns and an SA-19 Grisom surface-to-air missile. The missiles were arranged in two banks of four and had a semi-active laser guided capability, infrared and command radar. They had a range of more than ten kilometres and a 65 per cent probability of passing within five metres of the target, when they would be activated by a proximity fuse. The Indian crew fired off two at a time, increasing their chances of a hit and causing crippling damage to the Pakistani sorties. Within the first hour of the airstrike, the main enemy airbases were out of action and Pakistani pilots stuck to defending their own airspace against Indian attacks.

Singh’s plan was to neutralize his area of attack, knock out every visible enemy position, and lay down a field of rocket and air attacks to kill any infantry and armoured division which tried to enter the area and then advance. The onslaught must have been horrendous for those on the receiving end. Unit after unit abandoned their secure radio links and Singh listened to networks swamped with calls for ambulances and commanders repeatedly asking for permission to move their positions.

Illuminator shells went off far away so pilots could see their targets more closely. High-explosive shells burst with flashes and plumes of bright yellow and orange fire spiralling up from the desert. All tanks were to avoid population centres, and infantry battalions were to dig in around the villages, laying them to siege. Warfare psychologists would then move in to convince the remaining enemy troops to surrender.

Singh’s orders were to secure just one small town, Walhar, which straddled the railway line twenty-five kilometres south-west of Rahimyar Khan. This is where he expected his highest casualties and heavy close-combat fighting.

Earlier, at the headquarters briefing, he had been told to cut the line between Pakistani Punjab and the barren province of Sindh in the south, where fresh weapon supplies were being shipped in through Karachi.

‘We have information that a new air-defence system is being delivered from China and will be transported by rail to Rawalpindi, Lahore and Sargodha,’ Lieutenant General Jyoti Bose had told the assembled corps commanders. ‘If we bomb the line from the air, they will fix it. So this is not a symbolic seizure of land. General Singh has to take control of this arterial rail route, hold it, and prevent weapons supplies delivered by sea in Karachi from reaching the north.

‘The main thrust of the Indian advance will be in the north. We will attempt to secure the Shakargah bulge, or “chicken’s neck”, where we failed in 1971. One Corps will move against Sialkot from Jammu from the north-east and up from Gurdaspur through Narowal from the south-east. We are avoiding the more direct route through Shakargah because of the Ravi and Degh water crossings which lie in the way. A separate attack will be made through the Wagah crossing towards Lahore. Our advances will stop before Lahore and there will be no attempt on Gujranwala or Wazirabad, regardless of the extent of the Pakistani collapse. Sialkot will be taken if possible.

‘So, to sum up, gentlemen, Indian forces will go into Pakistan in the south and secure the small railway town of Walhar. Our major assault will be in the north, threatening Lahore and taking control of the Shakargah bulge, which will then come under permanent Indian control. The consolidation to create a buffer on the western side of the LoC in the north will continue.’